Abstract:

To ensure virtual enterprise ( VE) reaches the desired goals，the owner should design effective mechanisms to avoid moral
hazard． In view of the VE exists principal agent relationship between the owner and the partner，we incorporate the partner’s fairness
preferences psychology and design an effective incentive mechanism considering the partner’s fairness concern to prevent the moral
hazard problem，and compared to the traditional principal agent model． Analysis results show that the fairness preference has changed
some of the conclusions of the traditional principal agent model that influences the effort level and the revenue sharing． The owner
should try to choose the partners with lower intensity fairness preferences psychology to avoid moral hazard in order to increase its own
profit．

Key words: virtual enterprise, moral hazard, fairness preferences, incentive mechanism

摘要：

虚拟企业要达到预期目标，盟主必须制定有效机制成功规避运行中的道德风险。
针对盟主和盟员之间存在委托代理关系的虚拟企业，考虑盟员的公平偏好心理，建立了公平
偏好下的虚拟企业委托代理契约模型，分析了盟员公平偏好心理和道德风险问题之间的关系，
对比了传统委托代理模型和公平偏好下的委托代理模型。结果表明公平偏好因素改变了传统
委托代理模型的部分结论，盟员的公平偏好强度对努力水平、收益分享具有重要影响，盟主应
选择公平偏好强度较低的盟员作为合作对象以规避道德风险。

关键词: 虚拟企业, 道德风险, 公平心理偏好, 激励机制